




NOTES

ON

METAPHYSICS LECTURES

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METAPHYSICS.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

1. *Constructive* philosophy is a product of the historic consciousness, based upon historical data and the results of empirical science, especially psychology. *Assuming* the existence of reality, it is an ever-renewed attempt to determine its nature, and man's relation to it through his function of apprehension. Its two questions are, the *problem of reality* and the *problem of knowledge*.

The theory of reality, or metaphysics proper, is the more ultimate of the two problems, and with it *ancient* philosophy began. Zeno of the Eleatics, the Sophists, Socrates, and Plato, represent the gradual transition of thought from the ontological to the epistemological standpoint. Aristotle developed psychology. Later on, the theory of knowledge degenerated into skepticism, and the question of reality again became prominent. In *modern* philosophy, this order was reversed by Descartes, its founder, who began with consciousness as the organ of knowledge. The question of reality did not arise until later and has never dominated. A theory of knowledge is, logically, a necessary preliminary to that of reality.

2. *a.* DESCARTES, 1509-1560, in his *dubito*, expressed a complete revolt from Scholasticism, but his spirit was not negative—he sought a solid basis for knowledge. This *basis* is the indubitable fact of self-conscious thought. *Cogito ergo sum*, is not a demonstration, but rather an assertion that thought, *i. e.*, the doubt itself, which knows itself to exist, exists—or that that of which thought is a function, at once doubts and knows that it doubts and, therefore, that it exists. His *criteria* of truth in the content of consciousness are clearness and distinctness; his *method*, deductive or mathematical ratiocination.

Two movements grew out of Descartes' work, the *Rational* and the *Empirical*. The former, like its founder, ignored sense as a source of knowledge; adhered to rational data and the mathematical method; gave to the world Spinoza, with his system of pantheism, Leibnitz with his individualism and his invaluable "principle of

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sufficient reason," and closed with the formal dogmatism of Wolff. The latter movement started with the representations of sense; used the inductive, genetic method; and ended with skepticism devoid of spiritual insight.

b. IMMANUEL KANT, 1724-1804, was the first of modern thinkers to see the function of criticism, and to attempt to combine the sensuous and rational data of these two movements and reform their methods. He proposed the *critical method*; distinguished between the formal and the material elements of experience; identified the formal elements with Wolff's rational categories, and the material, with the sensuous data of experience; sought to vindicate the categories against skepticism, and the necessity of sensuous data against dogmatism; and tried to show that both the sensuous data of experience and the subjective data of reason constitute limitations to knowledge.

The *Critique of Pure Reason* includes three parts. As to knowledge in the sphere of *sense-perception*, things phenomenal and things-in-themselves are distinguished, the latter being unknowable. The phenomenal thing consists of a material element, the 'impression' or feeling, back of which in the object lies the thing-in-itself, and the formal element, the categories of space and time which spring from the subjective ego. Kant speaks of that which is universal as objective, and in this sense all the categories are objective; but they are subjective in this origin and, to the individual consciousness, in their function as well. The same is true of the categories and their material content in the scientific knowledge of *the understanding*. The former, *e. g.*, causation, are a priori, rational and original elements in experience—the necessary formal conditions of science. Also in the sphere of *higher reason*, the ideas of a soul, a world-ground, and God arise in the mind and develop the sciences of rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. But is this sphere of ideality, so necessary to thought, an actuality? Kant does not answer in the negative, but says the passage from the ideal to the actual cannot be made. We simply do not know, as all the categories of knowledge are valid for the phenomenal world alone. The idea of God no more signifies God than the idea of \$500 signifies the actual possession of that amount.

The *Critique of Judgment* maintains the thesis that the appearance of design as an immanent teleology in nature, is due not to its actual existence but to the fact that the category of finality is sub-

jective. The world is not yellow, though to the jaundiced eye it seems to be. Hence design does not indicate the existence of God.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant reverently recognized and named "the categorical imperative." The moral consciousness necessitates the postulates of freedom, that man may be the subject of duty; of immortality, that he may realize perfection; and of God as the ground of unitary moral issues and destinies. The "categorical imperative" cannot, like other categories, be purely subjective in its origin and function, as each man would be an end in himself and the universe could have no one "End-aim." Hence, man is driven to make these postulates, and to act *as though* they were true, but on the side of theory he can not *know* that they are.

Here Kant left the problem—as to the phenomenal and noumenal spheres, the latter with its shadowy suggestions of a soul, a world-ground and God, is unknowable, while the former is the sphere of knowledge, and approaches the unknown at two points, viz., where sensation veils the thing-in-itself, and where the subjective categories come trooping forth from the pure ego.

3. THE LEADING TYPES OF POST-KANTIAN THEORY may be classified as they affirm or deny one or both of the Kantian limitations.

a. The NEGATIVE theories are—*a. Positivism*, affirming the sense limit. This is a synthesis of sensational psychology and phenomenal metaphysics, being a reversion to Hume in the former respect. It originated with August Comte, and was supplemented in Great Britain by the Humian psychology. Its *data* are sensibility, and its laws—G. H. Lewes, "Problems of Life and Mind." Its *categories* are, the sensible or that which is known by the senses; the supersensible or that which, like the North Pole, cannot be observed, but would fall under the sensible if observation were possible; and the suprasensible or metempiric, the sphere of supposed rational and spiritual realities. The first two exhaust *the limit of knowledge*. Inasmuch as the sphere of sense with its analogies occupies the attention of men about nine-tenths of the time, they naturally tend to a positive view of the world.

β. Spencerian Agnosticism is a synthesis of Humian sensationalism and Kantian agnosticism. It asserts both the sense-limit and the subjective limit of knowledge, but, more radical than Kant, it maintains the inconceivability as well as the unknowability of the world of noumenal reality. To Kant it was a world of con-

ceivable ideals, though merely ideal. Its *data* include sense with its analogies, but also a supersensible postulate, the unknowable Absolute. Kant declined to assert the reality of the latter. Sense and its analogies include the genetic process of knowledge, postulating not merely the experience of the individual, but race experience and heredity as well. The *criterion* of knowledge is a reversion to a Stoic conception of necessity, viz., "the inconceivability of the opposite." Spencer's psychological theory of knowledge prevents the assertion of objective reality, but on the above criterion he says the object must exist. The *limit* of knowledge is sense and its analogies, as in Positivism. We can assert the existence of a supra-sensible absolute but cannot know or conceive it. As to whether Spencer is a spiritualist or a materialist, his position is simply well-balanced uncertainty. He maintains that we can assert nothing of either spirit or matter, and rebukes Fiske's tendency to Theism as a violation of the logic of the system. (Cf. discussion of Religion between Spencer and Frederick Harrison in *Popular Science Monthly*, 1884.)

b. The POSITIVE theories are—*a. Intuitionism*, represented by Reid and the Scottish School. Their motive was the vindication of belief and knowledge against Hume. It is a reaction from Kant's negative conclusions. Its *principle doctrines* embrace, as *data of knowledge*, the positions that the real object is known in the sphere of cognition and, in that of metaphysics, that the first and fundamental utterances of reason are objectively valid. Reid, Hamilton and McCosh are agreed as to these. The latter proposition is denied by Bain and Sully. James is an intuitionist in presupposing certain data of consciousness. Baldwin takes the functional view of consciousness, and holds that in its rational function it asserts certain great intuitions. As to *criteria of truth*, (cf. McCosh's *Criteria of Various Kinds of Truth*), each sphere of cognition has its own criteria. In sense-perception, the psychological tests of illusion; in discursion, the canons of inductive and deductive logic, and in higher reason, the sphere of spiritual intuitions, self-evidence, universality and necessity. The weaknesses of the school are its want of system and of synthetic construction.

β. Transcendentalism includes the post-Kantian philosophy of that which transcends experience. The *a priori* forms of reality which enter into experience are called transcendent, by Kant, as distinct from transcendental. Hegel is typical, and the Neo-

Hegelian School, including Lange, T. H. Green, John Caird, Edward Caird, Harris and others. Hegelism is a reaction from Kant's subjective limit of knowledge, asserting the ontologic value of reason. Neo-Hegelianism is a reaction against Comteanism, or the limitation of knowledge to sense and its analogies. The *data of knowledge* are the same as those of pre-Kantian rationalism: they reject all sensuous elements. But unlike Spinoza and Leibnitz they do not regard rational data as empty concepts, but as the dynamic activities of Absolute Spirit, having the categories as its immanent laws. It is spiritualistic ontology. The *process of knowledge* is the process of the self-evolution of Spirit. It is "the dialectic." Hegel's *Logic* aims to begin with the lowest category, Being, and show that the categories, one after another, force the mind on in a dialectic process of concretion, until it reaches self-conscious Spirit, illustrated in the individual man, in which is to be found the explanation of things. (Cf. Harris, *Logic of Hegel*, or Hegel's "Logic.") The categories of knowledge developed in this process are the categories of Reality also. Hence the identity and the circle of knowledge and being. Spirit goes out of, or "others," itself in nature; passes through nature into humanity; and returns again to the bosom of its own absolute Being and Knowledge in the self-conscious Notion. The circle includes all reality. It is a radical refutation of the Kantian divorce of knowledge from reality. The *limit of knowledge* is the limit of being. Some defects later.

In *conclusion*, diverse types only show the prevalence for a time of latent tendencies of thought which are asserting and re-asserting themselves throughout history. Types are usually right in what they maintain, wrong only in their narrowness and in what they deny. They are signs of life rather than of death.

PART I.—THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

Introductory.—In what sense is *consciousness the organ of knowledge*? In view of its content. Each state of consciousness, in so far as it is cognitive, is a synthetic activity. What this holds in its grasp is the content of the state, *i. e.*, the object. The correspondence theory presupposes a disjunction between what the state of consciousness grasps and the object. But the object is primarily

in that state. Correspondence between individual precepts, concepts, etc., and some broader system of reality does arise, but only in the process of experience, and hence it is internal.

The "*psychologist's fallacy*" is the confusion of his own standpoint with the state he examines. The *epistemologist's fallacy* is the making of a fictitious disjunction between the object and the primary act of knowledge. The former is a confusion of first with second intentions; the latter, a reading into the process of knowledge, as a first intention, distinctions which belong to it only as a second intention. Knowledge never leaves its object. At first imperfect and fragmentary, it goes on to become perfect and complete. The realistic theory of knowledge is the theory that knowledge is always in close and vital contact with its object.

History of the epistemologist's fallacy in modern philosophy begins with Locke who conceived sense-representations or presentations as entirely disjoined from their objects, the latter being outside of knowledge. He then postulated, without evidence, a correspondence between them. Berkeley and Hume found it an easy task to destroy the hypothetical object. Hume reduced the entire process of knowledge to pure subjectivity. Kant's dilemma between the material element of sensation and the thing-in-itself is also fictitious. It underlies the entire post-Kantian movement. Spencer followed tradition in making the divorce of the cognitive process from the object of cognition, and then, to escape skepticism and an irrational conception of the object, postulated reality because of "the inconceivability of the opposite." Otherwise he would have fallen into the very abyss of Humian skepticism which, from the first, it was his aim to bridge over.

Distinction between the psychologist's and the epistemologist's points of view. The psychologist is interested in the nature and the developement of knowledge as a process in consciousness, in the structure rather than the validity of knowledge. Belief in reality is a common point, but the psychologist asks, not Is it well-grounded? but rather What is its origin? If he is wise he will assert the objectivity of the knowledge process, leaving the vindication of its objective validity to the epistemologist.

Self and not-self must not be identified with the knower. Together, they make up the known. The knower is related to both. It appropriates the object to its own content, tacitly assuming that the entire sphere of objectivity exists for some owner or knower.

Hence self and the world are the objects of investigation. The six *genetic stages of knowledge* which arise are the Feeling, the Representation, and the Idea of the world and of self.

1. KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD. *a. The world-feeling—its significance for knowledge.* However early it arises there is really no world at this stage; it is merely a mass of sensations without knowledge or presentative elements but forming the material for later knowledge. The germs of mature reflection are here, but it is an "epistemologist's fallacy" to read into this stage the disjunction between our subjective feelings and the objective world which appears later. It is a feeling of both self and the world.

b. The world-representation is simply cognition or perception of the world. In the psychological process of developing the world-representation out of the elementary word-feeling, are three stages.

Differentiation. *Localization*, concerning which it has been disputed whether the mind "throws" its states out into the objective—an idea which James ridicules. Baldwin asserts that some do not distinguish between the thought and what it thinks. *Localization* should be attached to that which perception perceives. *Intuition* includes and emphasizes the synthesis which gives a unitary world-representation.

Objective elements in the world-representation are denied in all theories which assert the Berkelean "*esse est percipi*." Kant's disjunction of sensation from the thing-in-itself may be so classed. This "epistemologist's fallacy" is the postulating a substratum of qualities or an unknowable thing-in-itself as the real object and then denying that it exists or that mind can know it to exist, by reducing it to a part of the subjective process itself. The logical implication is either that every possible world-representation is false, or that the mind cannot know whether it is true or false. The objective elements in the world-representation are *space*, *time*, and *material presentative elements* or qualities of things. The latter cannot be called matter without anticipating the "epistemologist's fallacy."

a. Space. *Is it an original element in perception?* Spencer derived it from time; Bain, from the perception of motion; Lotze, from motor sensations and "local signs." Each unconsciously introduced a space-element into his data, and failed to develop space from that which is not spatial. Berkeley maintained a synthesis of the data of vision, which gives surface, and the data of tactual

and motor sensations which give the perception of depth. James and Ward regard "extensity" as an original quality of all sensations, and the germ of space-perception. *Is space objectively real?* Avoiding the epistemologist's fallacy, the truth is that the object which perception perceives *is* real. "The inconceivability of the opposite" is valid negative evidence. There is nothing to indicate that space is anything but what it pretends to be. "Noumenal space" is the idea of a spatial thing-in-itself and is simply a part of the Kantian "fallacy." Yet there are many questions as to space which mathematics has yet to answer. Space seems to fall under the category of the sphere, and straight lines may be but arcs of infinite circles. Many think, after reaching a higher view, that the lower is illusory and thus make it all illusory. All knowledge is of a piece—all true or illusory.

β. Time—cannot be defined. Described, it is on one side, duration, on another, succession. Its *nature* yields the idea of a procession of changes, a series, and becoming. Such must be the nature of the world if time is a real element. Without change, there would be no world-vision. The Eleatic τὸ ὄν, the changeless reality, eliminates all perception and they were logical in denying its objective validity. This is the inevitable outcome of denying the reality of time. In philosophy, a principle should be chosen and then applied "remorselessly," and, if it leads to negative and skeptical results, rejected; for the world is not built on a negative scale. The normal is positive; the abnormal, negative.

Is time original in perception? Hume tried to deduce it from succession, and others from change. But succession and change are temporal already. This resembles an effort to lift one's self over a fence by the boot-straps. Time must be regarded as original. *Is it objectively real?* First, it is the form of the world-series—hence, if subjective, the world is subjective, and unreal. Second, the only time is that which we know. What attributes will describe "noumenal time" other than those of the time we know? Only the epistemologist's fallacy could give rise to the conception.

γ. Matter. This is the "stuff" which fills up the forms of time and space. The question whether the object is a plexus of qualities merely, arises in later reflection. Neither this distinction, nor that between form and matter, arises in perception itself. *Qualities* are "obtrusive points" or material elements. Perception is the psychic function of combining these into the world of time

and space. *Are material elements objectively real?* The subjectivity-theory regards them as affections of the organism and denies the reality of the entire object of perception. On the contrary, we should regard the object as intra-perceptual and deny the existence of anything extra-perceptual. Not that there may not be a sphere of reality which we have no senses to perceive, but simply that what we do perceive is real.

Tests of reality in the sphere of perception. Both illusion and actuality are real. To distinguish the latter, Baldwin names three tests—the *intensity* of the perception, *uncontrollableness* of the object, and *resistance to muscular effort*, the last being the ultimate test. Pickler mentions *volitional control*, the fact that we can dispel the object by turning the head, etc. Another is *uniformity or repetition of experience*.

c. *The world-idea, as given in reflection.* The objective validity of the memory-function depends on the validity of the cognitive function. Within the function of memory, however, arises the distinction between the true and the false, and hence the need of psychological tests. *Two stages* appear in the development of the world-idea, both belonging to reflection, viz. the *discursive* and the *intuitive or rational*, giving respectively the analytic world of science and the idea of the world as a unitary whole. Reflection has two aspects.

a. *The formal aspect, or logic.* Its *starting-point* is the so-called laws of thought, Identity and Difference. In Plato's mythical account of the mind, the Same and the Different are its two ingredients. These have to be translated into the facts of non-contradiction, the immediate categories of reflection. All thinking is simply following the trail of identity in the midst of difference. "The world exists," says Plato, "for the man who can rightly divide and define." The formal *stages* of reflection are three—the *concept-function*, as distinct from the percept-function, is reached by the processes of abstraction, which gives the mind different "view-points" or aspects of the world, and generalization, which classes things under these aspects. The *judgment-function* is one of predication, proceeding upon a problematic basis. It conceives some matter under some "view-point" as subject and effects either a synthesis or a diremption between this subject and other matter in relation to it. Predication effects either unity or diversity. Qualitatively each judgment both affirms and denies, includes

and excludes. Objective relations of quantity are mathematical; those of quality, dynamic. Quantitative judgments are either equations, pure quantitative judgments, or quantitative judgments about quality, as in symbolic logic. Qualitative judgments express either pure qualitative relations, or qualitative relations partly quantified, as *Some men are bright*. The *inference-function* is the application of identity and difference, or non-contradiction, to the judgment-content of knowledge. The objective term with which it deals is the predicate. It can proceed only on the basis of affirmation. It has two forms, immediate and mediate. The former, the application of the dialectic of identity and difference to single judgments, includes implicates in its affirmations, and dispartes in its negations. Mediate inference arises from the comparison of two or more judgments, just as judgment arises from the comparison of two or more concepts. The total or partial identity of content in two judgments is the basis for a third, and without this identity a third is impossible. The four types of inference are, quantitative reasoning about quantity, quantitative reasoning about quality, partially qualitative reasoning about quantity, and pure qualitative reasoning. The calculative type includes the first three, dealing with all quantitative relations: the subsumptive type deals with the qualitative relations of genera and species: and the generalizing type with the qualitative or dynamic relation of causation. The latter is induction. By *method* is meant the manner in which the mind approaches its object. It may proceed deductively, *i. e.*, downward from axioms and principles to details, or inductively from empirical details to the principles which express their synthesis. As sciences develop they tend to become more and more deductive or rational. Synthetic activity is the nerve of this process of reflection in which the mind develops our world-intuition. As the object is intra-perceptual, so the *relations* of objects which are traced in the process of reflection are *objectively valid* in all stages of the world-intuition.

β. *The material aspect of the world of discursive reflection.* Its *basis* is energy in perceptual forms, leading to the idea of energy as manifested in objects and, ultimately, to the dynamic *categories* which underlie our scientific view of the world. *Substance* is the conception of permanence. *Change* arises from conceiving substance or the real as a temporal succession of momentary pulsations. *Causality* is the inner dynamic principle of dependence among the

pulsations of the changing series. The principle of causation applied regressively to the series gives the conception of conditional dependence; applied progressively, that of *developement*. *Interaction* is more than a completed idea of causation. The latter connects together antecedent and consequent in a forward movement. Interaction expresses the reactive influence of consequent on antecedent. The series is not a forward-moving stream of one dimension, but rather a stream whose cross-section presents many coexisting energies. Interaction is the relation of these coexisting energies to each other. These categories give us the scientific intuition of the world, the material aspect of the world of discursive reflection, the *basis of science*.

J. S. Mill developed the scientific view of causation, denying that cause can be conceived under the category of volition. But adopting his general view, we may, if we choose, follow it back to its source in volition and thus reach simply a metaphysical, as distinct from an empirical, view of it.

Method of reflection in developing the sciences. Logic is the science of the instrument of scientific knowledge. When it loses the consciousness that it is the instrument by which mind comes to know reality, as in the Hamiltonian School, it becomes a purely formal and empty discipline. Application of the instrument to the spatio-temporal or formal aspect of nature yields the mathematical sciences—geometry and algebra, the latter being the true sphere of mathematical knowledge. These sciences applied to the action of forces on bodies have yielded Mechanics. Application of the instrument to the material aspect of nature gives rise to the *generalization* and classification of her phenomena into sciences. And Bosanquet points out that the last stage is one of *explanatory theory*, the tracing out of the dynamic basis or cause of phenomena.

The world of scientific intuition. The categories of time and cause give the conception of the world as a series of dependent pulsations—a conception containing in it the idea of limitation. A series would be impossible except for this law of conditional dependence giving rise to pulsations which, on one side, are coming to be, and on the other ceasing—origination and decay. Under the space category the world presents itself as a plurality of parts, substances, or energies. Being energies, these parts necessarily interact. Mathematical and dynamic scientists viewing the world, on the one hand, as a plurality of energies, and, on the other, as a series, emphasize respectively combination and dynamic dependence or causation in

phenomena. When they meet they seldom fail to enter into controversy, as (*e. g.*) in the case of J. S. Mill against Whewell and Jevons as to the nature of induction, the former maintaining that proof, and the latter, that hypothesis constitutes its essence. Combining the two conceptions we get the idea of the world as a plurality of coexisting and interacting elements, all bound together and directed forward by the law of conditional dependence which is a law of development.

Aspects of the world-series. *Becoming*, incessant change with no point of self-dependence or absolute rest and permanence, the "flux" of Heraclitus. *Causal dependence*, everything, even man himself, saying, My explanation is not in me. *Interaction*. Lotze argued for internal modification to explain change; and, since this is only possible for soul-like being so far as we know, for a conception of all reality as spiritual in origin and type. A plurality of monads presupposes one substance as a medium of interaction. So in our plurality of energies or substances there is no ground for interaction. The series points out of itself for both its dynamic explanation and its ground of interaction.

Adequacy of the idea of the world as a series. The *eleatic view* of the world of change as an unreal appearance, forever pointing back to τὸ ὄν which is the abiding negation of all that can change and is alone real, denies the reality of the world with which man's lower organs converse and destroys the dignity and value of science. On the other hand the *view of Heraclitus* that change and becoming alone are real, reduces all to phenomena. There is no point where things are what they are, no πρὸ στω, no starting-point or possibility of knowledge. Skepticism is the logical result.

The synthesis of these two views was attempted by Kant in the third part of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Dialectic. The question arises in the third and fourth antinomies. The third presents the dilemma that the universality of causal dependence and the necessity of free and independent causation can both be proven and neither refuted. The idea of dependence does not exhaust causation as a principle of explanation; there must be a cause which is not conditionally dependent. The fourth antimony asserts that the proposition asserting an endless contingent series, and the one asserting that the contingent series must have a self-existent ground are equally demonstrable. Hence the necessity that higher reason perform a synthesis connecting the world as a

series with a perfect unitary ground, for its ultimate explanation. This is *rational intuition*. Spencer also asserts that a rational view of the world demands a *world-ground*, an Absolute, as well as a system of phenomena. Philosophers agree on this. Moreover, look at *causation*, the principle of dependence on other. Causal explanation is not satisfied by pointing to an antecedent. This says, It is not in me, as clearly as the consequent. The philosopher, therefore, sees that explanation can be found nowhere unless there be a Self-existent. Again, the *series* would break up without an immutable principle of continuity. If everything were to cease to be self-identical and become absolutely other, there would be no ground for science or knowledge. Change is logically inseparable from permanence and presupposes it. Again, *plurality* is an abstraction of difference which presupposes the One. Thus an immutable, self-existent Unity is the presupposition of all cognition.

We have here developed the higher logic of reflection, proceeding through which, reason reaches its world-idea; just as before we developed the logic of lower cognition. In both cases intuition is simply the last of a series of progressive transformations of the world. The child can get its child's view of Shakspeare. *It is true as far as it goes*. And the grown-up man has not realized his clear world-vision by burning his boats behind him; but by gathering up everything as he goes until he has balanced the great globe itself between the great shoulders of his mind. Each aspect of the world must be preserved if we would understand the complete reality. The spatio-temporal view is qualified by the apprehension of the deeper dynamic relations of science—substance, cause, interaction—and using the scientific intuition for her pedestal reason mounts to her unitary vision of the whole. Each stage of the world-idea contains its own principle, but no principle is final or self-explanatory. Each presupposes its higher until the stage is reached, the principle of which is self-explanation, or self-existence, itself.

2. KNOWLEDGE OF SELF. The object of self-knowledge is not simply the knower or pure ego. The distinction between subject and object is an implicit one which cannot be made explicit at this point.

a. *Self-feeling* exists as the vague, undifferentiated basis of consciousness and the first stage of its development in animals and children. It includes the feeling of the reality of self both subjective and objective. b. *Self-representation* has two stages, in the

first of which children first manifest self-reference somewhat by a weak self-appropriation. In the second stage, the spontaneous synthesis or unitary apprehension of self is made. It begins with a distinct sense of "mine", reaches the stage where the child realizes the sense of "me", and concludes when it has learned the use of "I." It may learn this use as a lesson of language, and probably has not yet realized the distinction of self from not-self. The result of the spontaneous synthesis of self is the undifferentiated antecedent of that which, later, contains both subject and object.

c. *Self-ideation or intuition* includes both the empirical and rational intuition of self. a. The *empirical intuition*, as well as the rational, is the result of reflection. The first stage is the intuition of the not-self. Philosophy began with the Ionian Physicists who had not realized the self as subject. Reflection soon turns inward upon itself both in the history of philosophy and of the individual. The first impression of self is that of a "flowing stream" (James) or plexus of states of consciousness which Kant analyzed into a formal and a material aspect. On its formal side, each state is a synthetic activity or function of—what? This is the problem of rational psychology, resulting in the *rational intuition* of self. Kant taught that the plurality of activities or states of consciousness are all related to a single unitary principle, self-consciousness or the "unity of apperception." Kant denied that this can be identified with the soul. Modern psychology asks the question whether this science needs the soul as a working-hypothesis, and answers, It is indispensable. (Cf James' Psychology I, X) James names the objective flowing stream the *me* as distinct from the subjective *I* which he identifies with the "passing Thought," something which comes into existence and vanishes at each pulsation of thought. He says empirical psychology needs nothing more, and leaves the question of a soul for rational psychology to discuss. But if empirical psychology needs this Thought, it probably needs much more. The "passing thought" thinks the stream, remembers, grasps the present, thinks itself, and then dies after transmitting its entire content to its successor. It performs the function of that which is persistent and self-identical and it is difficult to see how that function can be performed by anything so transient and perishable. Prof. Baldwin regards this as simply the latest form of the Humian psychological atomism, and as open to approximately the same serious objections. (Cf. J. H. Green's "Introduction to Hume.")

Characteristics of the psyche. *Psychic activity is always triune.* Wundt says intellection and volition are inseparable. It is impossible to find a state of pure feeling, pure intellection or pure will. Baldwin regards even sensation as containing an element of discrimination, the germ of intellect; of selection, the germ of will; and of feeling. Again, the function through which the ego recognizes, *i. e.*, thinks, feels, and wills, itself, is the *circle of highest intuition* which constitutes man an individual as distinct from a mere psychic thing like the dog.

The law of the psyche in the time series is the law of *development*. In the lowest stage the psyche is passive, though still characterized by thought, feeling and will. It develops toward an ideal of ethical, rational, and aesthetical aggressiveness. Progress is a series of higher and higher stages, not a movement straight-forward. The plane of each stage is determined by certain categories. The lowest are those of time and space—the child asks, What? Next is the category of cause—the lad asks, Why? Last are the categories of unity, ground, and finality—the young man asks, How? Here the conceptions of that which is self-existent and self-dependent arise. The *will* is first passively responsive to external stimuli; then moved by the strongest internal desire; then autonomous and self-legislating, motivated by the highest intuitions of practical reason. And *feeling* also develops from mere impulses of pleasure and pain up to the refined emotions of ethical and aesthetic ideality.

Essential constitution of the psyche. Does the principle of individual conscious existence, the law of psychic development, lie in the psyche itself, or in the interaction between the psyche and the body? Plato's *Phaedo* discusses the question whether the relation of soul to body is that of the harmony to a harp or of a rower to his boat. A harmony does not react on the harp—the soul does on the body. Consciousness has too much control over the body, is too individual, does too much for itself, progresses from passivity to self-activity, is too teleologic in its reference to that which is ideal, is too creative—things which the body could never do. How could that which is a mere function of matter transcend the body of which it is a function so as to create its own existence, till it has built up a whole universe of its own? Yet the brain is the organ of the mind in every state.

How is the psyche's dependence on the organism to be conceived? Two theories—(1) the Cartesian, that there is a pure spiritual

principle in relations of dependence and interaction with the body. This leads to an irreconcilable dualism. (2) That in the atomic constitution of things, there is a psychic duad in which the primal synthesis is effected. In some sense, the combination of psychic duads will be soul's development. This view renders the interaction of mind and matter *immanent* in the constitution of the psyche. It explains the *closeness* of their relation to each other. It explains the law of psychic *development* from the sensuous to the ethical. The corporeal, being lowest, dominates and underlies the entire development as its basis. How this synthesis is effected, leads directly to the general problem of metaphysics in the sphere of rational psychology. The question will be renewed in § 6.

3. THE PROBLEM OF THE WORLD-GROUND OR ABSOLUTE. Of the two negative theories of the Absolute, Positivism denies both the necessity and the knowability of the self-existent, which we saw (§ 1, c, β) to be the category of absolute reality. Knowledge is all a function of the categories of sense. All others must conform to these. But we cannot point out any sense in which the categories of sense have a firmer basis than those of the understanding or higher reason. According to Positivism, nine-tenths of our world is a dream. The Kanto-Spencerian theory asserts the necessity of the self-existent, but denies that we have any categories under which to conceive such things. But the Absolute is here recognized as the Cause of the relative. Cause by which we recognize the synthesis of the Absolute and the relative cannot be a purely relative category. If it were relative, the absolute postulate could not be made and the system would become Positivism.

Nature of the Absolute. Eleatic τὸ ὄν reduces all reality to the Absolute, leaving no relative or becoming. Platonism regarded things as real only in so far as they partake in their absolute essences, the ideas. The relative and phenomenal never became real to Plato, and he failed to give definite determination to the ideas. His teleological conception of the Good points logically to a spiritualistic conception based on self-conscious Being. Aristotle transformed Plato's absolutism by identifying the ideas with the forms and energies of things, rendering the idea a principle of individuality. Hence δύναμις is potency; ἐντελέχεια, that into which a thing develops in its progress to activity; and ἐνέργεια, the capacity of becoming actual which is presupposed in δύναμις. Three categories of movement—that which is moved but does not move;

that which moves and is moved; that which moves but is not moved. These assert two spheres of which Aristotle makes a synthesis, nature including man and matter with their evolution, and the ground of nature. The Absolute is *ἐνέργεια*; it moves but is not moved, *causa sui*. It gives motion and communicates energy to nature or the relative. He regards it as Deity and names it God. The Deity is self-contained energy, but completely transcends the relative so as not to operate on or in it by any outgo of volitional energy. The Deity is not ethical, but blessed—an æsthetico-ethical condition. Man should love God, but expect naught in return. There is no providence or retribution. The world is to be attracted to God as its end. Defects—(1) He fails to conceive the Deity under the category of self-conscious personality which we take up later. (2) He fails to conceive a causal relation between God and the world. Simply the “touch” of the Absolute communicates motion, but the genesis of the relative itself is unexplained.

Aristotle's Conception of the Absolute is a synthesis of actus purus and the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras. Why ascribe intelligence to the world-ground? (1) The world's order and harmony show it. (2) The principle of ground is itself a rational principle, and the demand for a world-ground is a demand of rational necessity. (3) The causal relation is an intelligent one. Science and philosophy both assume that the world is a system of intelligible relations. The irrational neither demands nor admits of explanation. “Like explains like.” It is a mistake to say, as subjective thinkers do, that the real world cannot be known, placing the object outside all categories of reason. To Kant, the real is simply what intelligence cannot conceive.

Summary of characteristics of the Absolute. (1) The demand itself for a world-ground is a demand for a permanent, self-identical, self-existent, and unitary cause of phenomena. (2) It is self-active intelligence.

The Absolute and attributes of consciousness and personality. Theories have asserted (1) that the ground of the world is non-rational and unconscious, and (2) that it is rational but unconscious. We have passed beyond (1.) The only alternative left after denying the rationality of the world-ground is the doctrine of chance. It is not consistent to speak of force as endowed with a principle of orderly procedure. This is postulating intelligence as far as it goes. As to (2), Von Hartman is its greatest exponent. Schopen-

hauer regarded the world as the product of irrational, unconscious. Will, intelligence being a secondary product of its blind activity. Instinct or blind striving is all beside it. Von Hartman pointed out that the world's order cannot be explained by instinct. There must be reason as well as will at the heart of things, but still unconscious. We do not here discuss whether the conception of unconscious intelligence is a contradiction. It is the conception of blind intelligence and is very little above instinct as a principle of explanation. Von Hartman really remedied the defect of Schopenhauer by postulating an idea as immanent in the unconscious reason of the Absolute. This immanent principle of ideality however is not sufficient. It simply admits the necessity of conscious foresight and knowledge without satisfying the demand for it. Blind rationality, as well as blind will, fails to fulfil the demand made by the world of its principle of explanation. Conscious intelligence alone contains in itself the rationale of its own activity, and is alone adequate to explain the phenomena of the world. Only the highest in the world can afford an adequate explanation of the world. Moreover, since the world-ground is to be conceived as self-activity, the absolute consciousness must be conceived as self-consciousness; for it is impossible to conceive of conscious self-activity which is not self-conscious self-activity. A man is self-active only in so far as he is conscious of a principle of activity within himself. The highest principle of explanation will possess the highest and richest content—*Ens realissimum*.

4. PERSONALITY. a. *General discussion.* The phenomenal conception of P. (= personality) is that of consciousness in connection with the body. It assumes that it has no roots which go deeper than this correlation and that when this is dissolved P. must disappear. Averoes, and other Aristotelians of the Middle Ages denied immortality on this ground. Conceiving man as νοῦς παθητικός, and the Absolute as Νοῦς ποιητικός, P. is attributed to the former. This is the basis of the modern denial that P. can be attributed to the Absolute. Hence the first question, Is P. bound up with passive or with active reason? Prof. James' insight is here superior. He distinguishes between the empirical "stream" of consciousness and the "pure ego" which he identifies with the "passing thought." The function of this ego is an active one, viz. to think itself, i. e., to gather up the stream into the personal form. This is P. and the insight shows that man, as an individual

possesses or rather is an active principle and that P. is the form of this activity. Again, in the metaphysical sphere, the conception of the ego as the centre of personality combined with that of a self-centred and self-active ground of consciousness gives a conception of P. not as having its roots in the empirical stream but as the form of the active reason. P. is primarily a self-conscious self-activity which is essentially a personal principle, reducing everything it touches to the personal form. Distinguish between the concrete content and the root-form of P., and the latter is not phenomenal (Averoes) but is grounded in the self-activity of *νοῦς ποιητικός*.

How is personality to be conceived? The tendency to-day is to subsume it under the category of individuality. As we have seen, it is conscious self-activity and is therefore an immanent, dynamic function or attribute of reason. Individuality, on the other hand, is due to unity—it is a whole which cannot be resolved into parts without destroying it. It is a unitary, static attribute, not a dynamic one. It is moual. But personality, as an immanent activity or self-manifestation of reason may be dual or many. The one reason may have many self-manifestations. We can conceive of a series of personalities, within a single individual. So long as individuality is construed in static terms, no confusion is possible between the unity of individuality and a plurality of persons.

Another objection to ascribing personality to the Absolute has been made by Spencer and other subtle thinkers, viz., that personality as an immanent, dynamic idea presupposes the existence not only of self, but also of a not-self, to which the self stands in relation, while absolute means unrelated. The fallacy consists in supposing that the self depends upon the not-self as a stimulus for its activity. This is not true in the case of man. Self-activity means, an activity which begins within self, an activity the first stage of which is included within self. The idea of self-activity initiated *ab extra* is a contradiction. Having made this correction, the objection is a reasonable demand in so far as it points out that personality cannot be construed as self and no more. The first step of self-assertion, while self-initiated, presupposes something in differentiation from which the assertion takes place. That something is the not-self. Hence arises

The essential dialectic of a self-active consciousness. In the genetic psychology of children, Baldwin points out that the first

stage of consciousness is one in which differentiation has not yet begun. It is called the objective stage, but in no sense does the child, in it, recognize an object as distinct from the subject. It is conscious activity, for what the child actually perceives is a product of reconstructive processes of its own tiny consciousness. In the second stage, called the projective, the child begins to differentiate some things from others, usually persons, *e. g.*, its nurse or mother. It does so, probably, by identifying its pleasure of food or rest with the presence of one person and its pain or inherited fear with another, *i. e.*, out of its own consciousness it projects certain elements into what we, observing, name its not-self and vaguely identifies one element with one person, and another with another. The third step is the bifurcation of self from not-self, called the subjective stage. The last, the ejective, is the stage of mature consciousness where so many of our subjective experiences have been associated with the object that only the trained observation of a scientist can separate the actual phenomenon from the spurious details which the usual observer unconsciously throws around it. This is enough to show that conscious self-activity may be the primal origin of all that exists to the individual consciousness, although in its first stage self and not-self do not arise. Reasoning from our psychology along the line of the principle of sufficient reason, we find that an analogous dialectic is essential to the self-activity of the ontological world-ground. But this caution—the stages which are temporal in the finite consciousness cannot be thought of as such in the absolute self-activity which originates the category of time as it does all else. In relation to the Absolute, “who changes not,” they express not temporal stages, but logical distinctions. On the basis of the primal self-activity arises the dual intuition of self and not-self. But *how is this first process to be conceived? As a synthesis of intellection, feeling and volition.* No philosophy is adequate which construes the primal self-activity of the Absolute in terms of any one of these. The first movement is self-activity, and hence the logical order will be, intellectual apprehension of self and not-self, feeling in regard to the not-self, and volition motivated by this feeling. Royce makes Thought the primal self-activity of the Absolute. He does not mention feeling and volition, but so far as it goes his intuition is correct.

Supposing this intuition to be complete, what would be the emotional attitude of the Absolute to the not-self? What would

be the motive for the volitional outgo of creative energy from the self into the not-self? Jealousy? Anger at the discovery of a rival? A desire to assert self by the conquest and extinction of its opposite, as in Manichaeism? None of these, as absolute self-activity includes in its self-existence all worth and all power. The not-self could simply be the negative of all this, and in no sense the rival or opponent of the absolute self. Moreover, this being the case, the only volition possible is the complete giving up or surrender of self. The Absolute alone is, and he *himself* can go out into the not-self, volitionally, but no form of selfishness or self-assertion could ever give rise to a world, or yield any result but a sharper opposition of self and not-self. Hence, love can be the only motive for volition, the good-will in its ideal form, *i. e.*, an absolutely disinterested self-devotion out of regard for the rightness, the absolute moral beauty, of the act. Creation does exist: volition, then, occurred: its only possible motive was love. Later, we shall see that the fact that creation is to arise in the sphere of the not self of necessity rendered it limited, dependent on something beyond itself, and a sphere of development beginning with the lowest categories of consciousness—time and space—and ending with a being whose nature is like that of the Absolute in its form—a self-conscious self-activity. But the fact of dependence on other makes self-activity possible only when this being has identified his self or nature with that of his great Original, speaking of its form; and the fact that he is a developing creature makes this nature of the Absolute a perpetual ideal to him which he feels he ought to realize. (This is anticipating, and only part of this paragraph was in the lecture.) A system of theology might be deduced from these data. We have reached the conception of the world-ground as an absolute self-activity which is to be conceived as a rational personality. We might apply the term Absolute Spirit to it.

b. Historical Theories. *a. Materialism* breaks the synthesis of ground and intelligence and attempts to trace the ultimate explanation of things to a ground conceived as analogous, not to the highest, but to the lowest in the world. Its defect is blindness. *β. Abstract substantialism* chooses some abstract conception of being for its ultimate principle, excluding change and becoming as an illusory veil of Maja. Such theories are one-sided in the direction of unity and in the philosophy of religion lead to pantheism and abstract monotheism. Again, they fail to explain concrete reality.

Hegel's Logic takes being and nothing as the highest and the lowest abstractions, and if the student does not read the content of his own spirit into the categories, concrete reality is not reached.

γ. *Theories of abstract intelligence*, began with the *Noûs* of Anaxagoras and Aristotle. The Eleatics conceived the world as a unity; Anaxagoras, as an organism; the former, as existing; the latter, as existing for something. Anaxagoras conceived the world-ground as intelligence, to which Aristotle added self-activity. If intelligence be construed abstractly, it involves all the difficulties of abstract substantialism. The richest and most concrete idea of intelligence, not the most abstract idea, must be adopted. *The Logos-theory* of the world-ground has taken several forms. Perhaps the Stoics first used the term—possibly it was used by Heraclitus. *The Stoic conception* is the principle of intelligence pantheistically construed. They identified the Heraclitian 'flux' with fire, translated it into *Noûs*, and they applied to it the term *λόγος*—a universalized impersonal reason. Defects—(1) How can active intelligence be conceived as existing without taking the personal form, self-manifestation being the category of rational activity? (2) The Stoic ground follows up the world and man, reducing them to unreal manifestations. Like Hegelism, it leaves no room for finite personality. All pantheism tends to reduce the world to an unreality or illusion. *The Neo-Platonic conception* of the *λόγος* is based upon Platonism and Orientalism. The absolute One, unknowable and inconceivable, cannot come into contact with the many. The Platonic ideas are adopted, after conceiving them as quasi-personal emanations from the One, as intermediaries between the world and God. They are called *λόγοι*, but they do not reveal the nature of the One—the principle of intelligence is external to the One. The emanation of the *λόγοι* from God is inconceivable; and hence, the nexus between the world and its ground, as well as the ground itself is unexplained. Out of this movement sprang Gnosticism; but the logical outcome is Agnosticism. Spencer regards both the Absolute and the relation of the world to the Absolute as unthinkable, although asserting that the latter is a relation of dependence.

The Christian conception of the *λόγος* is the central insight which christianity brought to the world; it corrects and deepens the former theories. On the theoretic side it is the conception of personality or self-manifestation as the central principle of explanation; and on the practical side, the conception of the supreme

value of the human spirit. The λόγος is not a principle external to being, as in Neo-Platonism, but immanent in being. It simply places self-activity and self-manifestation as the highest categories of being. The manifestation is the uttered word, the λόγος, which is the medium in which the Absolute carries on the creation of the world and the nexus between the world and its ground. It translates the world-ground into a living Spirit. We must not confuse the λόγος-principle with a particular person or manifestation, although the term is often applied to both.

c. *The dialectic of personality.* The λόγος-principle gives us intelligence of the concrete nature of Absolute Being, and also enables us to conceive his relation to the world in the form of a dialectic, which includes the several logical stages of the self-activity of the world-ground.

The dialectic of personality—emerging principles. As we have seen, the first stage of absolute self-activity must be an intellectual movement of intuition in which self and not-self are dualistically realized. It is purely intellectual as Royce insists. Feeling and volition must be implicit in it, because we translate it into self-activity, the self assertion of Being. This dual intuition leads to a self-assertion in the not-self, giving rise to identity in difference in the creation of forms analogous in nature to absolute Being. This volitional outgo of the absolute self into the not-self is at once an act of self-assertion and of absolutely disinterested self-abnegation—the eternal norm of every ideally moral act; just as love, the motive of this act, is the norm of every ideally moral emotion. Here also is seen the root of the categories of *Identity* and *Difference*. The former is the Spirit's self-assertion: the latter, the Spirit's negation of the not-self. This movement implicit in self-activity, becomes explicit in the volitional outgo of energy in creation; and here is seen the ground of the principle of sufficient reason which is simply the negative side or reversed reading of the affirmative principle of self-assertion. And absolute assertion, as we have seen, after its material and dynamic content has been abstracted from it so that we can construe it formally and statically, is simply Identity. Likewise the static and formal aspect of absolute not-self-negation is Difference. The principle of sufficient reason is not phenomenal. It can never be understood and its demands can never be satisfied until we reach a spiritual principle of explanation. The creation of the world in time and space could

not satisfy the absolute motive of love. Creation must go on to unify the whole in the development of forms, in nature analogous to the Absolute. Hence *Unity* is simply the deepest principle of the absolute nature as it is the highest principle of creation. From this point of view the coming to earth of the ideal Mediator between man and God was no accident or after-thought; but such an event that, had it never occurred, man's everlasting need of it would have proven his creator to be a being both irrational and malevolent; without unity as the highest category of his intelligence or love as his profoundest emotion. But, had such been the case, probably no world would ever have existed. (But the course is not responsible for the last two sentences.) As a *principle of insight*, the λόγος-principle is applied (1) in theology to conceive the relation of Christ, as mediator and redeemer, to God and (2) in philosophy to render the nature of God intelligible.

5. APPLICATION TO THE CATEGORIES OF REALITY.—How far has philosophy a right to use light which comes from other sources than itself? As far as it needs to go in order to appropriate all the insight in the world to itself. There is a misconception here. It gets all its materials from an objective source, viz. history, philosophy being a function of the historic consciousness. If the philosopher finds insight in the canons of authority, he may utilize it according to his own methods without, in doing so, disputing authority.

Hegel has demonstrated that the categories of reality are three, viz. Being, Non-Being, and Becoming. Applying the λόγος-principle to

a. *Being*, we need but summarize. Being we have identified with the self-existent, self-active personality, *i. e.*, Spirit. Absolute Spirit grounds the sphere of relativity and explains it.

b. *Non-Being*. Without a negative objective datum, thought is shut up to "identity philosophy." This is the weakness of modern philosophy. The negative is as actual as the affirmative. If it were not, the principle of identity would alone be valid and the Eleatic position alone defensible. Tendencies to one-sided optimism, to fatalistic determinism, and to pantheistic denials of the existence of finite personalities are all involved in the want of a negative datum in our thought.

a. *Historical review*. *Orientalism* contains two theories, viz., those of the Hindu and Parsee religions. Hindu thought is closely

related in its type to Eleatic thought. The world of change is a deceiving veil of Maja, which must be penetrated in order to reach the real. The highest goal of life is "entrance into Nirvana," unconscious unity with the eternal and changeless. It is the speculative, ethical and religious spirit of Orientalism. "Parsee Dualism" is a phrase which expresses the Parsee conception. It is being, divided, and warring against itself. The conception has no negative. The principle of evil is positive, rendering the dualism absolute. Unity is destroyed in diversity, just as diversity was destroyed by unity in Hindu thought. They expected Ormazd, the good Spirit, ultimately to triumph over Ahriman, the evil Spirit. In *early Greek thought* there existed a one-sided assertion of unity. To the Eleatics, becoming was non-being. In *Platonism*, $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ or matter is the negative element in the creation of the world. A positive element was the ideas. Plato adopted a teleological view of creation. The ideal forms are to overcome the negative principle which resists and, in a negative manner, accounts for imperfection. Plato manifested a dualistic tendency and asserted the necessity of a negative element. *Manichaeism*, originated by Mani, was the next form of dualism. The movement influenced the Gnostics and Judaism and raised the issue within Christianity. *St. Augustine* is connected with this attempt to graft absolute dualism on Christianity. He rejected absolute dualism, but caught an intuition of the truth of the negative. He also rejected the Platonic $\epsilon\lambda\eta$, but he speaks of "the nothing" and "the nothingness" (cf. *Confessiones*, books XII, XIII; *De Civitate Dei*, book XII). It is purely negative, but none the less real on that account, according to St. Augustine. 'There is no griffin' means that the system of reality has no relation to a griffin; but there is "a nothing" to which the system of reality does have a relation. He is the author, so far as we know, of that conception. He believed that the negative enters into creation, *i. e.*, that the ground of a creature is not in itself, it is not self-explanatory. The absence of self-explanation refers one to a transcendent source. Again, this absence of a principle of self-existence constitutes a creature mutable, *i. e.*, liable to fall. The negative must be construed as the ground of the modifications of creation which constitute it relative and not absolute; that is, it grounds the differentia of the relative. Augustine did not succeed in tracing the negative back to its first principle, and hence has been almost lost. In *modern thought*, *Hegel* asserted a misconcep-

tion of the negative. He asserted the necessity of both being and non-being as categories of the Logic; but he construed being as the thinnest possible abstraction, stripped of all qualities, instead of the richest possible conception of the *ens realissimum*. He identifies being and non-being, and asserts a dialectic relation between them in which being goes over into nothing. Wherever we find the negative in Hegel it is simply the Absolute masquerading under the form of self-negation. The system has no real negative. The result is a closed system of identity philosophy. Hegelism has always been regarded as weak in the scientific sphere. In fact, it reduces the entire sphere, if not to illusion, then to unreality. Every philosophy must be monistic ultimately, but should also recognize the negative in such a way as to give reality to the relative.

β. The rational interpretation of non-being. Everything depends on our conception of being. If it is the last and thinnest abstraction it becomes itself a negative, and to say it is identical with nothing (Hegel) is obvious. Having these two, the idea of a dialectic between them is an illusion. Being is a positive reality, and it denies, not itself, but its opposite, non-being. The opposition itself is primal, antedating the relative. We must translate absolute being into absolute Spirit, and its opposite into the negation of spirit. Modern thinking has identified reality with being and found no place for the negative. We should enlarge our conception of reality so as to include both. Spirit is dual: its activity is dual. There must be an opposite of being or there would be no motive for being's self-assertion. The negative can no more be translated into the positive than vice versa.

The necessity and function of non-being. Without non-being there would be no motive for the outgo of creative self-activity. Negation must be real to render creation possible, not as an immanent principle in being which would in that case be relative and not absolute, but as the opposite of being itself. The two must be qualitatively external to each other, and the only datum through which the distinction between the immanent and the exeunt energy of Absolute Spirit is possible, is not-being. Why should man be so everlastingly active and restless, ever going out of himself in self-assertive struggle, if there is no negative? So being goes out of itself to generate being where there was only being's opposite. Contemporary thought does not know what to do with the negative. It is one of the most difficult and last elements to

be mastered. Hegel said the real labor of thinking is connected with the negative—hence “the labor of the negative”—but our insight will be deepened ten-fold if we grasp it.

c. Becoming is the old term applied to the generated sphere. Heraclitus’ “flux” is one side of it. Its *relation to the Absolute* can be expressed in two propositions—(1) Becoming is generated on the negative side of absolute Spirit, in the sphere of want and negative. (2) The potency of the Absolute becomes immanent in Becoming and is the hidden spring out of which the energies of the relative flow. Its *characteristics and fundamental law* may be deduced. Arising in the sphere of negation it must be, not infinite, but *limited*. As the volitional expression of absolute being, it must be a *dynamic* movement. Under the categories of time and space—the lowest categories of reality—it must take the form of a plurality of *interacting elements* and of a *serial flow*. Being in want of any principle of self-dependence, it must be a sphere of incessant change where everything is *dual*, coming to be and ceasing to be, a synthesis of being and its opposite. Heraclitus saw only the negative side of the relative; his “flux” is only the passage out of being. Only the negative side impressed him, as others, and should lead to despair, pessimism, and skepticism. Moreover, if we consider it, the only creation possible was a sphere of *development*. Absolute Being could not go over into not-being. The only possible genesis is that of a creature who should develop through an infinite progression toward the nature of absolute Spirit—a creature the condition of whose existence is struggle and want. Scientists say that evolution is a universal characteristic of the relative, but evolution presupposes an absolute and self-existent ground as a spring of potential attainment. Without it, we can only conceive of movement forward on the same plane, but not of movement upward to higher and higher planes. This we saw when following the genetic method in the first part of the course (cf. I, *c*, β). Here we have followed the deductive method, proceeding from being through non-being to becoming, and have reached the same *fundamental law*, viz., the law of *conditional dependence* which, construed progressively, is a law of development.

The system of reality includes self-existent being, its opposite non-being, and becoming. By system we do not mean nature or the world, *i. e.*, the relative and generated. In a sense the idea of the universe is important; but the idea of “the universe as a

totality" is an impotent conception. "The totality of things," "the all" and "the All Father" in the sense of a totality are all weak and meaningless expressions. The valuable idea in the conception of a totality is that of a unity or system of interdependent parts including both the relative and its absolute ground. So of "the Absolute," it is worthless when used of "the totality of things"; and only has meaning when applied to the self-existent ground of things.

Basal categories of the relative. Approaching this conception from two standpoints by the inductive or genetic and the deductive or rational methods respectively, we have reached the categories of causation and development. (1) *Causality* we have seen to be the exeunt, as distinct from the immanent, volitional activity of absolute Being. Volition cannot be separated from intelligence without resulting in blind force and an inexplicable universe. Two types—(a.) *primal* causality is self-activity in the form of volition. Dr. Martineau (cf. *A Study of Religion*, vol. II,) shows, in one of the most elaborate discussions of causation in literature, that all causes point back to their primal type as Will. But he nowhere draws a distinction between primal and derivative causes, or reaches a conception of "natural causation," the law of contradistinct dependence on other; he hardly leaves room for it. On the other hand J. S. Mill (cf. *System of Logic* bk. III, V,) develops the opposite weakness. He seeks to show that the causation with which science deals must be construed, not after the volitional type, but after the serial type of dependence on other. He does not see that dependence on other presupposes self-dependence, and that self-dependent activity is volitional in form. Spencer traced causation ultimately to the Absolute. (b) *Derivative* causality is simply the serial form of dependence on other which we have seen throughout nature. Mill's discussion is the best in literature. This type of causation is mechanical energy, regardless of ends. It cannot be conceived as volitional with an intelligent purpose of its own. Any design or purpose which may attach to a natural cause must transcend the cause itself. It cannot be conceived as conscious without destroying the foundation of science. Nevertheless, intelligence and will are presupposed in the nature of things; and in saying this we are conceding the existence of a self-existent energy.

(2). *Development* is conditional dependence construed as the law of a forward and upward progress. Development is (Aristotle)

from potence to actuality. We cannot conceive anything as actual whose potential did not exist in its antecedents without violating the law of conditional dependence. Hence the importance of the question, What is potence? If it is merely a stored up actual, we cannot explain progress upward as distinct from mere movement forward in the same plane. By potence we mean some transcendent energy that is gradually working itself into the system of things. Hence the absolute potential spring must be inexhaustible up to the highest category of the actual when ideally conceived. And hence the validity of the principle of "sufficient reason" (cf. I, 5, c.). This is the most potent and completely explanatory conception in the literature of philosophy, rationalizing all things and reducing all to a unity. The higher things rise in the scale of development, the nearer they come to the level of the spring from which they flow. It is a world returning to the divine source from which it has sprung, a conception which best explains the relation of dependence of all things on this absolute source. The final voice of philosophy and religion must be the same. Potence may be either skill, *i. e.*, acquired, or natural capacity, *i. e.*, original endowment. It is the latter which presupposes a transcendent spring. Otherwise, spontaneous generation, although discredited in biology and philosophy as a violation of any adequate conception of causation, would have to be postulated at each step upward. Life can only spring from life. To say it is a spontaneous generation, no matter how favorable the conditions, would be scientific suicide. Everything except the Absolute has a history. *Stages of development*—cosmic nature, inorganic nature, organic nature, nature conscious in animality as feeling and instinct, and in humanity as reason and self-consciousness. Nature carries her baggage with her as she steps up from stage to stage so that man is the epitome of the whole process. This is the reason why he is last, and why he is a microcosm corresponding at every point to the macrocosm. Embryology illustrates man's nature as the epitome of the whole. With her last utterance on this point, philosophy must make a synthesis of the absolute ground and the process of development.

6. THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (continued from I, § 2, c). We had reached a conception of the constitution of the psyche as a duality which can neither be explained nor adequately expressed as body and soul. Only as a synthesis in the atomic con-

stitution of reality could we connect mechanism with spirit. We are here prepared to translate this apparent duality into terms of a growth from potency to actuality at each stage of which spirit unifies all preceeding stages. It becomes a synthesis, not of elements, but of the stages of this process so as to epitomize the entire world process. "Only like can know like" may be carried to an extreme; but the fact that the soul possesses the whole gamut of categories and can pass through them in her reflection as well as in her development—this is the ground and the possibility of knowledge, a fine basis for pedagogical theory. This shows *a. the soul's development from potency to actuality* and *b. the relation of the actual to an idea* of spiritual existence which is as unconditioned and changeless as the nature of the Absolute himself.

c. Relations of the soul—*a.* to the world-process are expressed above. *β.* To the Absolute. These may be expressed as unity and diversity. The ego-principle of rational self-activity, of personal selfhood, makes man generically *one with the Absolute*. This is pantheistic so far as it goes. The principle which grounds the life of the psyche is the creative principle which grounds the relative order. But it is not pantheism. It is simply the principle which makes intelligible the relations between man and the absolute ground of his existence. A man must reach the highest in himself in order to commune with God. The *diversity* of the two lies in the differentiating category of development and in the limitation and imperfection which that implies. The ego-principle is central in man, but only as a developing principle. Development is the fact which binds consciousness fast to its absolute Source. Hence our

d. Conception of the soul is that of a triune activity of will, feeling, and intellect—an activity which is in a process of development from potency to actuality, from mechanical laws and conditions to spiritual laws and conditions, and from mechanical necessity to spiritual freedom. You can never find an activity of pure volition, pure thought, or pure feeling—it is always a concrete synthesis of will, thought, and feeling, although any one of the trinity may be explicit in any single state of consciousness.

e. The experience of the soul falls into two categories—*a. genetic* experience of development from mechanical determination by other to determination by self, or self-determination. Intellectually, it begins as sensation, a response to external stimuli or "other," passes through the stages of perception where the mind is more aggressive

and reflection where the circle begins to return on itself, and culminates in the stage of intuition—what Plato called the contemplation of ideas—where the mind intellectually determines itself, *i. e.* contemplates the spiritual categories of its own content and constitution. Volitionally, the child is first moved *a tergo* by impulse; then learns to appreciate some objective motive such as authority; and culminates in ethical self-determination, or freedom, where certain immanent categories of its nature have become the spiritual laws of its behavior. Emotionally, consciousness begins with sensuous pleasures and pains, develops through a stage of objective interest, and comes to a spiritual self-satisfaction, which is only possible through self-denial and self-abnegation, in the emotions of love and beauty. These emotions motive the creations of art and “the beauty of holiness.” b. *Dialectic* experience is the inner core of self-activity in a creature. It is at first potential, the possibility of personality or self-manifestation in the creation of sciences, of artistic and religious ideality, and in right conduct. A synthesis of a. and b. gives us a conception of the nature of mental and spiritual activity which should be made the basis of all pedagogical theory.

f. *The principles of knowledge*, in the concrete sense of spiritual and mental activity are three. a. *Identity and Difference*, the basis of all logical process of abstract knowledge, the roots of the fundamental laws of thought, identity and contradiction. Plato named these the same and the other and denied that opposites can pass into each other. Every instance of deductive analysis presupposes this and also, when traced to its ultimate ground, the spiritually dual nature of ultimate reality. The motive of all deduction is the spiritual self-assertion in the sphere of the indeterminate not-self, identity in difference. The syllogism is the intellectual bridge which spans the primal abyss. Why is it that the mind cannot rest satisfied with phenomena and mechanical causation? Why is it driven back of phenomena and mechanism to the teleological ground of all, traversing the whole area of science and philosophy, before it can rest satisfied? It is simply the self-affirmation of spirit—the necessity of spirit to seek itself in its object. β. *Ratio sufficiens* is the principle of inductive generalization, starting with that which is farther from self. The principle leads to a gradual “innering” of our standpoint when we start with fact or phenomenon. The first stage is that of the classification of phe-

nomena and the generalization of their laws—this is the usual sphere of induction. Both induction and sufficient reason are principles of exclusion; but they differ in that the former accepts what is not contradicted, while the latter accepts what is positively demanded by the empirical data of the proposed metaphysical principle. They result, the former in a formal scientific law; the latter in the rational perception of concrete spiritual reality. Science is a mechanical discipline and achieves only mechanical explanations. As we have seen these are not ultimate and the mind will never rest until it has traced all mechanism back to a spiritual ground. Metaphysics, however, depends upon science for her data, and if adequate, will vindicate the value of science. The principle of identity and difference is a purely intellectual one; that of sufficient reason is volitional as well as intellectual. The last principle is

γ. Unity. The most concrete form of spiritual activity is emotional as well as intellectual and volitional. When emotion appears we have belief. Sentiments and convictions belong to the emotions of man's ethical and æsthetic nature, and involve a synthesis of the concrete life of spirit. The highest sentiment is love, the emotionally ideal sentiment of unification. Unity is the highest category of concrete intelligence. The two former principles, *α* and *β*, supply the problem of unification, an absolute and self-existent Spirit, the ground of a creation which arises in the negative self of the Absolute. In creation, we have the finite subjective self of the knower, and objective to him, the Infinite Self; to know whom, in every aspect of the activity of concrete spirit, is the essential life of the finite spirit. Where is the final unification of the two, the principle of identity and communion? For a developing creature, it must be the highest in his nature, his highest potential, viz., the Ideal—the nature of God, the absolute self-activity from which flow eternal truth, beauty, and goodness—the presupposition and source of all knowledge, the object of all art, and the source and inspiration of all good.

7. FINAL SOLUTION OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM.

The theory of knowledge cannot be completely separated from a theory of reality, the *presupposition* of the former, as we have seen, being the self-existent; and self-existence includes all reality. The *process* of knowledge embraces (1) the ascension through which spirit comes to a rational apprehension of self as physical, intellectual, and rational, and culminates in the intuition of self as spirit.

(2) That series of transformations by which the mind passes from its intuition of spatio-temporal reality to the rational intuition of spiritual Being as its ground. The *principles* of knowledge, traced out before, are (1) identity and difference giving an intuition of self and of not-self. This principle leads to that division. We must widen the conception of logic so as to include (2) the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of unity which cancels the division of self and not-self, tracing all things back to the infinite Subject.

Under the *constitution of knowledge*, the question of idealism vs. realism arises. Two standpoints—(1) the psychological, the gradual development of the world-vision. Knowledge viewed as a dynamic progress. Kant and Berkeley were right in their standpoint; but if we admit no other, we must assert that every knower, not only reconstructs, but also creates himself and his sphere of reality. (2) The ontological standpoint supplements the psychological. Epistemology arises because man's knowledge is *self-knowledge*, and his activity, *self-activity*. It differs from psychology and ontology, or metaphysics proper, in making a synthesis of their two standpoints and viewing the entire system of reality as demanding two facts to explain it, viz. the infinite Spirit and the finite. To the epistemologist, it is also clear that the psychological standpoint must be subsumed under the ontological. Subjective idealism simply eliminates the latter point of view. It recognizes the How of knowledge but not the What. All idealism is not subjective, however; it may postulate, as Berkeley did, both the infinite and the finite consciousness. We do not discuss Berkeley's logical right to these postulates; but point out that historical systems of idealism have not maintained that mind knows reality. That is peculiar to realism. Our own position, as it combines both elements, should be named Ideo-Realism.

PART II.—THEORY OF REALITY.

1. This is Metaphysics proper. Its *problem* is the What of knowledge. More ultimate than epistemology, its alternatives are not idealism and realism, but rather appearance and reality. A metaphysics which reduces the known to appearance will end in skepticism, as subjective idealism logically does. We do not reargue, but assume that the universe is a system of reality; and that the

essence of a man's life is to get out of his own subjectivity, and identify himself with an objective system of things. A man rises in the scale of being by thus unifying subject and object; by elevating his view of both until he can see the central principle of both to be spiritual and the same; and by striving to live in that principle.

2, There are *two standpoints* from which to do this—*a. Materialism*, which reduces mind and spirit to manifestations of a material force, conceived as absolute. Difficulties—*a.* Like sensationalism in psychology, it is a process of leveling down instead of leveling up, seeking to explain the system of things by analogies to that which is lowest in it instead of by analogies to the highest. *β.* It assumes what it seeks to prove. Physicists say “given matter and its laws we can explain the universe,” *i. e.*, given matter and *order*; but order itself is not explained by matter. Laws cannot be conceived as potencies somehow coiled up in material atoms. Given matter and its laws, it will explain mechanism, but *nothing more*. It stops short of consciousness and the free activity of the psyche. *γ.* It fails to explain the *demand* of reason for an intelligent principle of explanation in things. This is the real motive of all science and philosophy. We may start with matter, but will be certain, if we go on, to transcend it when the vital issues of philosophy arise. It isn't worth while to think unless we can deal rationally with the origin, nature, and destiny of man. We cannot reach an adequate metaphysics by choosing a principle of explanation lower than ourselves. Our method must be one of “leveling up,” not one of “leveling down.” On the contrary, we feel that there are vast reaches of reality which our highest category does not attain to; and it is this higher relativity for which we plead. This is the standpoint of

b. A spiritualistic metaphysics. Some of its *problems* will be—*a.* That of the *self-existent*, whether it is necessary to thought, and if so what its nature must be. *β. Elements of reality.* Absolute being as absolute spirit. Non-Being and Becoming. *γ. The relation of the material to the spiritual in the relative.* *δ. The psychic nature of man.*

3. *Monism and dualism.* The real cannot be identified with being, as among the Eleatics, without resulting in an absolute monism which cuts us off from some of the profoundest resources of metaphysics. On the other hand, an absolute dualism is irra-

tional. Our Metaphysics may be made monistic in the theory of being, and dualistic in its theory of the relative by asserting non-being as a negative prius of thought. The distinction between matter and spirit goes to the bottom of the relative, but lapses in the sphere of the Absolute. From the standpoint of the relative, dualism ; from that of reality itself, monism. Hence, *Mono-Dualism* expresses our theory of reality. By translating absolute Spirit into God, we reach a basis for religious philosophy.

PART III.—SPECIAL QUESTIONS.

CAUSATION AND FREEDOM.

1. *The general question* is presented in Kant's third antinomy (cf. *Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic*). Kant concludes negatively that mechanical causation does not explain all, and that there is room for free causation *if such a sphere of freedom could be realized*. Kant's theory of knowledge was inadequate. We have found reasons for construing ultimate reality as spiritual self-activity analogous to our own—as *Ens realissimum*, and Kant's sphere of free causation is simply this spiritual activity.

2. *The special question in the psychic sphere.* a. *Consider certain conceptions*—a. *Natural causation* is the law of a series, each member of which depends on some other for its explanation. Can it be universal? β . *Fatalism* applies a to the will and conceives man as determined by that which lies outside of the will itself. γ . *Motive* is in general the antecedent ground of choice—an impulse or a reason. δ . *Relation of motive to the will*. Motivation is never external but always internal to self, and β is refuted here. Being forced to do a thing is not normal choice, and man never gets into fatalism until enmeshed in the net of evil, as illustrated by the character of Tito Melema, in George Eliot's *Romola*. There is for each individual one point in the universe, call it the normal point, from which he sees all things in normal relations. There he is outside of fatalism and is self-determined ; but once let him drift away from that point and the forces that were for him there are against him : where he saw harmony he sees conflict. ϵ . *The law of the psyche* is one of self-determination and self-activity.

b. *The psychological aspect of volition.* a. Consciousness itself is teleological. It has ends and is not determined mechanically *a tergo*. β . Ends are always in the form of alternatives, and the

psychology of choice is a teleological selection of ends. γ . What is "psychological freedom?" (1) Freedom in the selection of these ends, and constraint would be fatalism. (2) The feeling of power in the selection of alternatives. This is often said to be an illusion, and that the strongest desire or impulse determines choice. Not so; our sense of power is power through the attention. Fixing our attention upon a weak impulse, the forces of desire marshal themselves about it. Libertarians are probably mistaken in saying we can choose another alternative directly; but indirectly we can accomplish it by simply giving attention to the impulse.

c. *The metaphysical aspect of the question.* Freedom must be identified with a higher, self-determined law—the law of the ideal self. Self is concrete and not a thin and barren abstraction. Self-activity is activity directed by self, to be sure, but still directed. The *end of self-determination* for a dependent, developing creature like man is therefore simply that concrete self-activity itself, which is ultimately the nature of absolute Being. Freedom is obedience to the ideal law which includes all others, the law of unity, giving rise, in the sphere of emotion, to art; in the sphere of volition, to the good-will, and in the sphere of intellection, to science and philosophy. These are the *motives* of freedom, and they are all expressed in the single emotion—love.

THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY. Neither proof nor disproof in the form of demonstration is possible. By immortality we mean man's power to survive the dissolution of the corporeal organism. Part of Plato's proofs have lost no force—the soul as a self-moved principle of motion: ability to survive moral badness—its *worst* foe: a teleological argument founded on the goodness and wisdom of the Creator (cf. John Fiske's *Destiny of Man*): metamorphosis in nature, but we are not quite so sure death is a metamorphosis: the soul can apprehend immutable truth and must, therefore, itself be immutable. Plato summarized ancient proofs. Cicero repeated them under the category of probability. *Modern thinkers* have discussed it little and their arguments can mostly be translated into Plato's. Moses Mendelssohn attempted the following proof—the soul is absolutely simple, therefore immortal. Kant's critique sought to refute this as simply an illustration of the fundamental defect of rationalism, viz., the claim to knowledge of reality. We do not know that self is real, said Kant. It is, however, a superstition to split the synthesis of "the unity of apperception" and

the multiplicity of states of consciousness, and then say we know the latter but not the former. There is no unitary self save that which appears in the multiplicity itself. Kant's refutation, however, is valid against all attempts at demonstrative proof. He really left the question open.

Our conviction of immortality rests upon moral and religious grounds as a faith of the concrete spirit, just as the existence of God is a conviction of the spirit. It cannot be resolved into mere intellectual opinion any more than into an emotion. Opinion and belief differ in that the former stops with the intellect while the latter enters into the triple constitution of spirit itself; it underlies the whole man, and is often deeper and stronger than he knows. Just in proportion as a man rises above the spatio-temporal stream, and becomes spiritually identified—i. e., intellectually, emotionally, and volitionally—with those higher planes of reality which are eternal and permanent, will the conviction of immortality which underlies his life be strong.

Modern perplexities in connection with the doctrine have taken the form of a scientific presumption against immortality. The mental is made identical with the physical, or else so dependent on it as to dissolve with its dissolution. This dependence is close, but what grounds are there for thinking that the presumption goes beyond the facts? 1. The growing conviction of psychologists that consciousness and spirit are teleological implies that the psyche takes the initiative in weaving the corporeal organism. 2. The nature of the psyche as developing from potential to actual self-activity and freedom seems to indicate that the whole process of evolution is simply to achieve the psyche's existence. Its relation to matter thus appears analogous to that of the foetus to the maternal organism. The former depends upon the latter until birth, when the dependence ceases. Hence our conclusion is that *so far as science is concerned the soul's survival is an open question.*

Positive considerations.—We must distinguish essential from modal conditions of existence. *Essential conditions* are those necessary to existence itself. In the case of the soul, the Absolute, upon which the entire relative order depends, is a necessary condition. The relation is one of dependence; but it is also one of identity and rest in so far as both are spiritual. The consciousness of the human spirit is also that of the absolute and this is the truth of pantheism. But the type of the psyche is that of a

spiritual potentiality developing into actual personal self-activity and individuality (cf. I, § 6, c, β). A *modal condition* is not one of existence, but merely of growth and evolution. We may regard the brain as a modal condition of the development of the psychic principle from mechanical existence up to free self-activity. The change at the end of life would then be one in degree, but not in kind, different from other changes continually going on in life. We conclude, then, that *there is nothing irrational or inconsistent in conceiving the persistence of the essential principle of soul-life throughout any change in its modal conditions.*

These considerations leave the question open to all moral, æsthetic, and religious considerations, and here they have their full force. Notes on the last lecture could not be included.

G. A. TAWNEY, '93.

